In 1981, the presidents of five leading research universities wrote to the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Commerce warning of the serious implications of restricting academic freedom where "sensitive," but "unclassified" research was being conducted. Largely in response to these concerns, the National Academy of Sciences formed a panel under Dr. Dale Corson of Cornell University. Its 1982 report, Scientific Communication and National Security, better known as the " Corson Report,"concluded that "security by secrecy" would weaken the country's technological capabilities, and that there was no practical way to restrict international scientific communication without also disrupting domestic interchange. The Panel called for the development of national guidelines for the "gray areas" between what is truly classified work and what is not.

The issue of sensitive, but unclassified, research surfaced formally in 1985 with the issuance of National Security Decision Directive-189 (NSDD-189). NSDD-189 states, in part:   to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information generated during federally funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification.

The policy was reaffirmed by the Bush Administration in 2001 and 2003. It provides that "no restriction may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. statutes." In essence, the policy places the onus on the scientific community to regulate itself. Although there has been little evidence that the scientific community considers dual-use research a real threat, there are now widespread efforts to increase awareness. This is especially important in light of the unprecedented expansion of research on select agents that has taken place since 2001.

Other policies that guided the pre-9/11 scientific community included the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories guidelines issued by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 1984 and the " Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996." The former describes combinations of standard and special microbiological practices, safety equipment, and facilities that constitute the biosafety levels for working with infectious biological agents and has been revised several times. The latter established (in addition to various immigration and legal provisions) strengthened CDC requirements for the "packaging, labeling and transport of 'select agents' shipped in interstate commerce, and place[d] additional shipping and handling requirements on facilities that transfer or receive 'select agents' that are capable of causing substantial harm to human health."